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1. Approaches to Existence
In	analytic	philosophy	the	concept	of	existence	has	been	approached	





Frege	and,	 following	him,	Russell	 argued	 that	 these	grammatical	
appearances	 are	misleading.	 If	 ‘exists’	 (‘is’)	 is	 a	 universal	 first-order	








[moon	 of	 Jupiter].3 So	 construed,	 existence	 statements	 are	 not	 obvi-
ously	true:	it	is	a	non-trivial	question	whether	a	concept	is	satisfied	or	
not.	(I	will	return	to	this	argument	in	section	7.)
Russell	 articulated	 the	 same	 idea	 in	 terms	 of	 propositional	 func-
tions.4	To	say	that	a	moon	of	Jupiter	exists	is	to	say	that	the	proposi-
tional	function	x is a moon of Jupiter has	a	value	that	makes	it	true.	If	we	
want	to	make	existence	claims	in	a	non-misleading	way,	we	need	to	
1.	 On	subject-predicate	sentences,	see	McNally	2011,	1830.	She	goes	on	to	re-
serve	 the	 term	 ‘existence	 sentences’	 for	 sentences	 that	 don’t	 have	 subject-
predicate	structure.	See	Moore	1936,	177f.	On	quantifier	sentences,	see,	 for	
example,	Evans	1982,	346–7.
2.	 I	 have	 changed	 the	 translation;	 page	 numbers	 of	 the	 German	 text	 are	 in	
square	brackets.	See	also	Frege	1884b,	63–4	[70–1]	and	Berto	2013,	13.	Frege	

















































such	 sentences	 are	 truth-evaluable	 and	 some	 are	 in	 fact	 true.	How-
ever,	their	translations	into	the	quantifier	idiom — for	example,	‘There	
is	Pluto’ — don’t	 sound	 like	proper	English	sentences.	 If	 ‘There	 is	…’	
expresses	a	concept	 that	subsumes	concepts	and	not	objects,	 this	 is	






(∀x) (x exists = df. ($y) (y = x))
If	one	utters	‘Pluto	exists’	with	assertoric	force,	one	asserts	that	there	is	
something	that	has	the	property	of	being identical with Pluto.7 
This	 revised	 Frege–Russell	 view	of	 existence	has	 been	highly	 in-
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is	neither	 in	harmony	with	 the	 grammar	of	 ‘exists’	 nor	 in	 line	with	
our	ordinary	conception	of	existence.	Walton’s	observation	gives	us	
a	positive	 reason	 to	 take	grammatical	appearances	 seriously.	Saying	
“Beans	don’t	exist”	has	no	restricted	reading,	because	‘exists’	is	true	of	
everything.	




to	 think	of	such	a	concept-expression	as	being	 just	 like	





ent) — Evans	 talks	of	 “Meaning” — will	be	a	 function	 that	maps	every	
object	on	to	the	True.	But	what	is	the	sense	of	this	predicate,	the	con-
cept	expressed?	 In	general,	 the	 sense	of	a	first-order	predicate	 ‘F’	 is	
given	by	a	true	statement	of	the	form:










tive.	 For	 example,	 Fine	 2009	has	 given	new	arguments	 for	 the	 con-
clusion	that	we	need	a	first-order	predicate	to	articulate	our	ontologi-
cal	commitments	(Fine	uses	‘real’	instead	of	‘exists’	to	distinguish	the	
But does John really believe that there is something that is identical with 
Pluto when he believes that Pluto exists?11 
With	 regard	 to	 tensed	 existence	 statements,	 proponents	 of	 the	
revised	second-order	view	need	to	find	a	place	 for	 tense	 in	 their	ac-
count.12	In	the	final	analysis,	a	statement	like	‘Napoleon	exists’	is	sup-
posed	to	say	that	the	number	of	the	concept	identical with Napoleon is 
not	0.	But	today	we	can	truly	say,	“Napoleon	existed,	but	he	no	longer	
exists.”	Prima facie,	this	requires	us	to	see	the	concept	identical with Na-
poleon as	having	different numbers	at	different	times.	But	the	concept	
identical with Napoleon does	not	subsume	different	things	at	different	
times,	or	one	thing	at	one	time	and	none	at	another	time.	Adding	a	
temporal	 adverb	 to	 ‘identical	with	Napoleon’	 does	 not	make	 sense:	
something	 is	not	 identical	with	Napoleon	 in March, for one week,	 etc.	
So	the	second-order	view	makes	tensed	existence	statements	difficult	
to	understand.	In	contrast,	‘exists’	can	be	combined	with	temporal	ad-
verbs — ‘exists	today’,	‘exists	on	the	on	the	15th	of	June,	1999’ — and	the	
extension	of	‘exists’,	like	that	of	many	other	first-order	predicates,	can	
vary	with	time.13
These	 objections	 suggest	 that	 the	 revised	 Frege–Russell	 view	









observation	 that	 the	 predicate’s	 extension	 varies	 over	 time,	 settle	 us	 with	
non-existing	objects?	Miller	(1986,	249	and	256)	showed	that	this	question	





























(Smiley)	 with	 judgement.	When	 one	 answers	 “No”	 to	 the	 question	




























differently	 from	 other	 universal	 first-order	 predicates.	 According	 to	
him,	the	sense	of	the	universal	first-order	predicate	‘exists’	is	‘shown’	
by	the	following	satisfaction	clause	of	an	interpretative	theory	of	truth:











This	 is	a	 serious	drawback.	For	 intuitively	 the	senses	are	different.	 I	
14.	 See	also	Mackie	1976,	258.
15.	 When	one	asserts	that	everything	satisfies	‘exists’,	one	does	not	need	to	spec-
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judgement	 of	 inner	 perception	 does	 not	 consist	 in	 the	
connection	of	a	mental	act	as	subject	with	existence	as	a	
predicate,	but	consists rather in the simple acknowledgement 






tion.	An	infant	is	not	able	to	judge	that his current experiences are such-













step	 further:	all	mental	acts	we	call	 ‘judgement’	are	acknowledgements.	 In	









cation	but	 in	 thinking	of	A in a particular mode. Brentano argues that 
the attitudes of acknowledging and rejecting are prior to the concept 
of existence in the order of explanation. I will explore and defend this 
approach to existence.
I	will	 first	 outline	 the	 basic	 notions	 of	 Brentano’s	 approach	 (sec-
tion	2),	then	motivate	his	account	of	existence	(section	3)	and	discuss	
objections	to	 it	(section	4).	 In	sections	5,	6	and	7,	 I	will	develop	the	
Neo-Brentanian	view.
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convey	our	ontological	commitments.24 Here is a literary example that 





























when	 this	 activity	 is	 not	 ongoing.	 This	 is	 registered	by	 the	 factivity	






term	‘posit’	(setzen) to refer to the mental act he has in mind:
There	is	an	A, A	is.	Not	the	connection	of	A	with	something	
else,	but	A	considered	by	itself	and	acknowledged	by	it-
self	 (no	 combination	 but	 position)	 [keine Zusammenset-














an’	versus	 ‘glauben, daß’).	Sometimes	 ‘believe	in’	 is	used	to	express	a	
positive	evaluative	attitude	(‘I	believe	in	love’),	but	often	we	use	it	to	
23.	 Rosenkoetter	2009,	545,	expands	on	this.






































logical	 form	of	 the	 sentence.	Gendler	Szabó	 (2003,	 593–4)	makes	 a	
good	 case	 that	 while	 quantifier	 phrases	 exhibit	 scope	 ambiguities,	
bare	plurals	don’t.	A	sentence	like	‘John	looks	for	unicorns’	has	only	
one	reading,	in	which	‘unicorns’	is	in	the	scope	of	‘John	looks	for’,	be-
cause	on	no	understanding	does	 the	 sentence	 commit	 us	 to	 the	 ex-
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3. The Motivation of Brentano’s Theory of Existence
If	believing	in	A	(acknowledging/positing	A)	is	not	believing	that	A	ex-
ists	(acknowledging/positing	that	A	exists),	yet	we	take	these	attitudes	




[On	 Brentano’s	 view],	 to	 think	 that	Obama	 exists	 is	 to	
represent-as-existent	Obama.	The	content	of	the	thought	























believe	 in	 it	without	being	able	 to	entertain	propositions	about	 it.28 
How	can	one	get	a	theoretical	understanding	of	such	basic	non-prop-
ositional	attitudes?	The	general	 functionalist	strategy	 is	 to	character-
ise	an	attitude	by	outlining	its	place	in	a	web	of	other	attitudes.	If	we	
employ	 this	 strategy,	 we	 can	 characterize	 positing	 and	 belief-in	 by	
outlining	their	place	in	a	web	of	non-propositional	attitudes	and	feel-
ings.29 Knowledge of the place of belief-in in the web of these attitudes 
is knowledge of what belief-in is. The ‘input side’ of the web is, in part, 

















be	helpful	 to	and/or	 convince	only	 those	who	are	 inclined	 to	accept	Bren-
tano’s	classification	scheme.	
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is	not	 “blind”:	 she	does	 it	with	a	 sense	 that	 it	 is	 the	ap-
propriate	thing	to	do,	that	this	is	where	the	cube	belongs,	
that	 this	 is	 what	 she	 ought	 to	 be	 doing	with	 the	 cube.	
(Ginsborg	2006,	361)














only	on	pain	of	 irrationality	 refuse	 to	 judge	 that	A	 is	 to	be	acknowl-
edged.35	Brentano	holds	that	if	one	is	able	to	form	a	view	about	one’s	
acknowledgements	and	one	acknowledges	A, one	will,	when	one	pays	
attention	to	it,	acknowledge	that	A is to be acknowledged:
[A]nyone	who	takes	something	to	be	 true	will	not	only	
acknowledge	 the	 object,	 but,	 when	 asked	 whether	 the	
object	is	to	be	acknowledged,	will	also	acknowledge	the	
object’s	 to-be-acknowledgedness,	 i. e.	 its	 truth	 (which	 is	












how	we	arrive	at	 the	concept	of	existence	 that	 starts	 from	consider-




In	 his	 unpublished	 Logic	 Lectures	 (EL	 80),	 Brentano	 spells	 out	 the	
Aristotelian	 thesis.	His	 starting	 point	 is	 the	 following	 consideration	
about	judgement:







acknowledgement	 as	 correct,	 fitting,	 or	 appropriate,	 as	 something	 I	
should	do.	Independently	of	Brentano,	Ginsborg	made	a	strong	case	
that	an	awareness	that	what	one	does	is	“the	appropriate	thing	to	do”	





32.	 Page	 numbers	 of	 the	 German	 text	 are	 given	 in	 brackets. 
33.	 Thanks	to	Sarah	Tropper	for	improving	the	translation.
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Kriegel disagrees with this reading of Brentano:
The	view	is	not	that	existence	is	the	property	whose	na-














pressions	good	and	bad	are	like the expressions existent and 








us	 to	understand	Brentano’s	 view.	Let	us	 start	with	Brentano’s	 treat-
ment	of	‘good’.	When	I	utter,	with	assertoric	force,	‘Champagne	is	good’,	
I	don’t	intend	my	audience	to	come	to	a	judgement	about	champagne	
to	the	effect	that	it	is	such-and-such: ‘good’ is	not	a real or	determining	




will	 receive	 an	 analogous	 explication.	 (Brentano	 1995,	
187–8/1924	II,	48–9;	in	part	my	translation)
Let’s	first	note	that	there	is	a	prima facie	objection	to	Brentano’s	claim.36 
In	 general,	 I	might	 find	myself	 unable	 to	 believe	 that	 p,	while	 also	
thinking	that	 there	 is	strong	evidence	that	 favours	that	p.	Belief	 is	a	
multi-track	 disposition	 to	 feel,	 think,	 and	 behave	 in	 certain	 ways.	
Some	of	these	dispositions	are	not	easily	changed	even	if	one	has	evi-
dence	for	or	against	the	truth	of	what	one	believes.	However,	while	
it	 is	 therefore	possible	 that	 someone	may	honestly	 and	 truly	 assert,	
‘Pluto	 is,	 but	 one	ought	not	 to	believe	 in	 it’,	 the	person	making	 the	
assertion	 thereby	 shows	 that	 she	 does	 not	 live	 up	 to	 the	 standards	
of	correct	judgement.	Hence,	one	can	acknowledge	A,	know	that	one	
does	so,	and	yet	refuse	to	acknowledge	that	A	is	to	be	acknowledged,	






cover	a	property	of	A:	it is to be acknowledged.	Brentano	coined	an,	as	he	
says,	“barbaric”	term	for	this	property:	the	property	of	“to-be-acknowl-
edged-ness”	(Anzuerkennensein) (Brentano 1995, 187/1924 II, 89). 
When	we	simply	acknowledge	an	object,	we	don’t	predicate	 this	
property	of	it.	But	when	we	acknowledge	something,	we	are	commit-
ted	to	 its	 to-be-acknowledged-ness	 in	the	sense	explained	above.	 In	
sum,	acknowledgement	 itself	 is	a	non-predicational	mental	act:	one	
simply	acknowledges	an	object.	But	we	can,	by	reflecting	on	acknowl-











































A	 predicational	 component:	 the	 concept	 expressed	 in	
existence-statements	and	thoughts	
One	discovers	and	understands	the	concept	of	existence	if	one	(i)	be-
lieves	 in	 (posits,	acknowledges)	objects	and	(ii)	 forms	a	view	about	
one’s	 attitude	 and	 its	 objects.	The	attitude	 is	 one	 that	one	ought	 to	








this	 concept:	 existence	 is	 an	 evaluative	 first-level	 concept:	 ‘x	 exists’	
means	‘x	is	to	be	acknowledged’.	




propose	that	existence is being posited/acknowledged:	there	are	things	we	
neither	have	nor	will	ever	acknowledge.	Neither	did	he	hold	that	exis-
tence	consists	in	correct	positability	or	acknowledgeability.38 Consider: 
38.	Meinong	(1910,	62)	 takes	Marty	 (1908,	314)	 to	define	existence	as	possible	
acknowledgement	(Anerkanntwerdenkönnen)	and	goes	on	to	criticize	the	defi-
nition	as	leading	to	the	“dissolution	of	being	into	possibility”.	The	criticism	
























ing	depends	on	 further	arguments.	Are	 there	 things	 that	are	not	ob-
jects?	Are	there	pluralities,	or	are	there	only	objects	we	refer	to	with	
singular	and	plural	 terms?42	Here	 I	will	 leave	open	whether	such	ex-
tensions	are	necessary,	because	my	main	aim	is	to	articulate	the	basic	
framework	that	may	need	extension.












propriate.41 The only answer that makes Brentano’s definitions look 
like definitions of existence and not replacements is this: One posits x 
correctly if, and only if, x exists. Brentano himself suggests this answer:
Whether	 I	 say	 that	 an	 affirmative	 judgement	 is	 true,	 or	
its	object	exists,	or	whether	 I	 say	 that	a	negative	 judge-
ment	is	true,	or	its	object	does	not	exist,	in	both	cases	I	
say	one and the same thing.	(Brentano	1889,	28	Fn	[45	Fn],	
my	translation)


























The	 leading	 idea	 of	 rejectivism	 is	 that	 a	 grasp	 of	 the	
distinction	between	 [assent	and	dissent]	 is	prior	 to	our	


























criticism	of	it.	In	his	review	of Brentano’s The Origin of Our Knowledge 
of Right and Wrong,	Moore	(1903,	117)	wielded	the	open-question	argu-
ment	 against	 Brentano’s	 definition	 and	 thereby	 supported	Husserl’s	
intuition.44 












does	not	 consist	 in	 knowledge	of	 a	definition,	 i. e.	 knowledge	of	 an	
analysis	of	 the	concept	 in	 its	marks.	 It	 seems	perfectly	possible	 that	















 ‘E’ Introduction  ‘E’ Elimination 
 !	T	   +	[E	(T)] 
	 +	[E	(T)]		 	 !	T	
 
 /T	 	 	 –	[E	(T)]	  









concept	of	positing,	etc.,	 to	 introduce	 the	concept	of	existence.	Our	
grasp	of	the	concept	of	existence	consists	in	the	disposition	to	judge	
that	T	 exists	 if	 one	 posits	 (acknowledges)	T	 and	 to	 posit	 (acknowl-
edge)	T	if	one	judges	that	T exists without any further premise. Some-
one who masters the concept of existence finds these transitions from 
positing to judgement primitively compelling and not in need of fur-
ther justification.
The	 Neo-Brentanian	 view	 of	 existence	 consists	 of	 the	 following	
three	core	claims:
 ‘¬’ Introduction  ‘¬’ Elimination
 −	P	   −	(¬	P)		  
	 +	(¬	P)	 	 	 +	P	
 +	P	   +	(¬	P)		
	 −	(¬	P)	 	 	 −	P
The	point	of	these	rules	becomes	clear	when	they	are	compared	with	
the	classical	rules:
 ‘¬’ Introduction  ‘¬’ Elimination
	 P,	X	 	 	 ¬	¬	P
	 :	 	 	 P
 ⊥     
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Yet	one	needs	 to	distinguish	existence	 from	other	first-order	con-




















The	 Neo-Brentanian	 view	 also	 provides	 a	 response	 to	 worries	
about	the	acquisition	of	the	concept	of	existence.	Kriegel	asks:







































is	 open	 to	 serious	objections,	 and	while	 there	may	be	 independent	
reasons	 to	 introduce	non-existents,	 the	communicative	point	of	 ‘Na-
poleon	exists’	is	misdescribed	by	saying	that	it	qualifies	Napoleon	as	
existent.	For	example,	after	reading	Richard	Whately’s	Historic Doubts 








versationally	 pointless	 and	 utterances	 of	 ‘Napoleon	 does	 not	 exist’	
manifestly	 false.50	But	many	assertions	of	existence	have	a	conversa-
tional	point,	and	negative	existential	statements	are	often	true.51	How	
can	a	first-order	 theorist	 account	 for	 this?	Evans	 (1982,	 362)	 argued	
that	an	utterance	of	a	negative	existential	involves	a	hidden	operator	















property	 of	 everything,	 this	 kind	 of	 differential	 interac-
tion	with	existents	and	nonexistents	would	be	ruled	out.	
(Kriegel	2015,	84)
The	 concept	 of	 existence,	Kriegel	 continues,	 cannot	 be	 acquired	 by	
coming	to	know	an	analysis.	For	being	cannot	be	defined	as	a	species	
of	a	more	general	kind.	Saying	that	it	is	an	innate	concept	just	pushes	
the	problem	back.	What	 is	 the	phylogenetic	mechanism	of	 concept	
acquisition?	So	the	universal	concept	of	existence	cannot	be	acquired.











sentence	 ‘Napoleon	 is	 short’,	 she	 refers	 to	Napoleon	and	says	some-
thing	about	him	 that	may	or	may	not	be	 the	 case	 independently	of	




This	 conclusion	 can	 be	 avoided	 if	 one	 either,	 like	 Russell,	 takes	






Napoleon	 can	be	 such	 an	 attitude	 even	while	 the	 semantic	 content	
of	 ‘Napoleon’	is	exhausted	by	its	referent,	if	there	is	one.	For,	as	Mil-











Now	 descriptive	 views	 of	 proper	 names	 that	 take	 the	 semantic	
content	of	a	proper	name	to	be	the	sense	of	a	definite	description	are	
implausible	 for	well-known	 reasons.	 But	 one	 can	 reject	 such	 views	












and	 suggests	 an	utterance	 of	 ‘N	 exists’	 to	 express	 a	 statement	 that	 can	be	
Brentano	has	an	answer	 to	 this	 conundrum	 that	posits	neither	a	















like	being	short,	but	comes	to	judge	that	one ought to have the attitude 











ments	 compatible	with	 the	view	 that	 ‘Napoleon’	 is	not	 an	abbrevia-
tion	for	a	definite	description?	For	if	 the	speaker’s	primary	intention	
is	 achievable	without	presupposing	 that	 the	 audience	 already	 takes	
53.	 See	Brentano	1973,	90	[144];	see	also	Brentano	1880ff,	90.
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